Based on Contingent Claims Analysis, this paper develops a method to monitor systemic risk in the European banking system. Aggregated Distance-to-Default series are generated using option prices information from systemically important banks and the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index. These indicators provide methodological advantages in monitoring vulnerabilities in the banking system over time: 1) they capture interdependences and joint risk of distress in systemically important banks; 2) their forward-looking feature endow them with early signaling properties compared to traditional approaches in the literature and other market-based indicators; 3) they produce simultaneously smooth and informative long-term signals and quick and clear reaction to market distress and 4) they incorporate additional information through option prices about tail risk, in line with recent findings in the literature.
One of the key lessons from the financial crisis generated in the US subprime mortgage market is the need to enhance and extend the systemic risk's analytic toolbox to guide policymaking.
The interest in systemic risk analysis is not that new 1 and was driven by last decade's financial innovation, liberalization and development. However, the dynamics of this financial crisis has triggered renewed attention and operational focus at a global scale.
The theoretical and empirical work of defining and assessing systemic risk in banking is making great progress (de Bandt et al., 2009) . As far as empirical research is concerned, different approaches have emerged in the literature to detect, to measure systemic risk and to attribute systemic risk to individual institutions in the financial system. These new approaches are either replacing or supplementing existing methodologies that failed to capture vulnerabilities prior to this crisis.
This paper introduces a method to detect and monitor systemic risk in the European banking system based on Contingent Claims Analysis. Without strong additional modeling assumptions, this paper generates two series of aggregated Distance-to-Default indicators based on data from balance sheets, equity markets and option markets. The first series is the Average Distance-to-Default (ADD), a simple average of individual forward-looking Distance-to-Default series, computed using individual equity options. This indicator is standard in the literature and informs about the overall risk outlook in the system and the intensity of systemic distress.
The second series is a Portfolio Distance-to-Default (PDD) that aggregates balance sheet information into a single entity and uses the option prices information of the STOXX Europe 600
Banks Index. This indicator supplements the information of the Average Distance-to-Default, outlining the joint risk of distress and embedding interrelations between the banks in the system, and also the dynamics between the bank index and its core constituents under tail risk events.
Other models are similar to mine in that they aim to capture and quantify joint risks and interdependences with the use of market-based information and include risk drivers such as leverage, size, interbank linkages or maturity mismatch. Recent and popular contributions and their extensions along these lines are found in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) , Acharya et al.
up-to-date market sentiment from option prices. In doing so, they react quickly to specific market events, when volatility of the components of the system increases and correlations tend to reveal increased interdependences and stock prices moving in tandem. The option prices information also enhances significantly the forward-looking properties of the series and makes their signals timelier than in either literature of market-based indicators or alternative specifications similar to mine in employing comparisons between a portfolio and an average of its components. Finally, tail-risk events are detected through option prices as market events affecting the whole of the banking system have heterogeneous effects on individual banks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first reviews the Contingent claims analysis' main features and applications -the supporting theory of this approach-then makes ref-
erence to a specific application of the literature that is a standard tool of systemic risk analysis. In Section 3, the paper provides a detailed description of the method which produces individual and aggregated series of forward-looking Distance-to-Default (DD) indicators using the information of the European banking system and its core systemic components. Section 4 reports the main results of the DD series, highlighting its main attributes as a systemic risk indicator and its advantages when compared to possible alternative specifications in the related literature. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Underpinnings

Contingent Claims Analysis
Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) is a framework that combines market-based and balance sheet information to obtain a comprehensive set of company financial risk indicators, e.g: Distance-toDefault, probabilities of default, risk-neutral credit risk premia, expected losses on senior debt, etc. Based on the Merton approach to credit risk, CCA has three principles: 1) the economic value of liabilities 2 is derived and equals the economic value of assets (which reflect the present value of future income); 2) liabilities in the balance sheet have different priorities (i.e. senior and junior claims) and associated risk); and 3) the company assets distribution follows a stochastic process (Echeverría et al., 2006; Gray et al., 2010) .
In this context, as liabilities are viewed as contingent claims against assets with payoffs determined by seniority, equity becomes an implicit call option on the market value of assets 2 Deposits and senior debt plus equity in the case of banks.
3 with strike price defined by the default or distress barrier (determined by the risky debt). As company assets decline and move closer to a default barrier, the market value of the call option also falls. The normalized distance between market value of asset and the distress barrier is called Distance-to-Default (DD) and constitutes the financial risk indicator used in this paper to assess and monitor systemic risk in Europe's banking sector 3 . Distance-to-Default indicates the number of standard deviations at which the market value of assets is away from the default barrier and can be scaled into probabilities of default, if the distribution of assets were known.
This method has initially been applied to company default risk analysis and disseminated by
Moody's KMV -see for instance Arora et al. (2005) ; Arora and Sellers (2004) ; Crosbie and Bohn DD series and other CCA-derived risk measures are forward-looking, easy and data-efficient to compute at high-frequencies. They are also good indicators of market sentiment, relatively less affected by government interventions and they incorporate most relevant elements of credit risk. Results in Gropp et al. (2004 Gropp et al. ( , 2006 International Monetary Fund (2009) and Tudela and Young (2003) , inter alia, show also that DD improves and even outperforms other indicators of financial stability including bond or CDS spreads. More recently, International Monetary Fund (2011) reports that aggregated Distance-to-Default series computed for the US banking system did a good job in forecasting systemic extreme events and in detecting early turning points near systemic events in the last decade, even though these series were computed using historical equity information.
As other market-based financial stability indicators, DD series may also be exposed to some methodological shortcomings originated in the quality of input data (International Monetary Fund , 2009; Financial Stability Board, 2009b) . In particular, DD series may be sensitive to market liquidity and market volatility and also exposed to the accuracy of the market assessment, meaning that it may be possible that in periods of high stress in financial markets or market freezes, the computation is not be possible to implement or and the DD indicators could produce unclear signals. At worst, even if stress signals from DD series were available, the indicator could at best be coincident with market events, leaving little margin for policy makers to react (Borio and Drehmann, 2009) Gray and Malone (2008) , the framework is flexible enough to introduce modeling variants and relax some of the assumptions, such as an ad-hoc default barrier, constant interest rates and constant volatility. As a result, several extensions in the literature have been developed in recent years. In particular, Capuano (2008) tackles the ad-hoc default barrier issue proposing an endogenously determined default barrier that rapidly incorporates market sentiment about the developments of the balance sheets, while Chan-Lau and Sy (2006) introduce modifications in the ad-hoc default barrier to capture pre-default regulatory actions, such as Prompt-Corrective-Actions frameworks, a common feature in the case of financial institutions. Findings in Echeverría et al. (2009) show that the choice of risk-free interest rates does not affect the estimates of DD significantly but their selection has to be adjusted to the specificities of the institutions and markets of analysis (see Blavy and Souto (2009) for a detailed discussion in the case of the Mexican banking system). Finally, as for constant volatility, this assumption is relaxed in some models that introduce time varying -generally GARCH(1,1)-volatility series. Research in Echeverría et al. (2006) and Gray and Walsh (2008) are good examples of this approach. Recently, Gray et al. (2007) and Gray and Jobst (2010a) developed further extensions of the CCA framework to analyze a wider range of macro-financial issues and systemic risk, such as sovereign risk, economic output, risk transmission across sectors and quantification of systemic risk contributions. These authors emphasize the role inter-linkages within the banking sector and between the banking sectors and other sectors in the economy through of risk-adjusted balance sheets. In these models, the authors stress the importance of aggregation of univariate CCA models of institutions or sectors into a multivariate framework that can track the interdependences and linkages within and across sectors. In Gray et al. (2010) ; Gray and Jobst (2010b) , the authors stress that conventional correlation measures based on realized data become unreliable in presence of fat tails , especially in times of crisis, and therefore develop a method where they account for both linear and non-linear dependence via extreme value theory techniques.
The potential to use aggregated DD series to monitor systemic risk is not negligible and, in the case of the European and other mature banking systems, this potential could overcome some of the modeling and signal quality weaknesses cited lines above via the properties of option prices of both individual equities and equity indices. In particular, Gray and Malone (2008) argue that the inclusion of external volatility such as the option-based volatility index VIX improves the performance of the Merton model and overcomes some of the shortcomings originated in its assumptions. Fleming (1998) and Yu et al. (2010) find evidence of the index options predictive power, while Becker et al. (2009) provide evidence of the ability of index options to reflect incremental information about jumps in volatility that model-based forecasts do not. Bollen and Whaley (2004) show that index options tend to have information about hedging strategies while stock options are mostly affected by bullish sentiment. Kelly et al. (2011) analyze the differences between options on a portfolio and options on its constituents and find public policy-driven sources of divergence in addition to the correlation component. The methodology described in the following section aims to include all these properties from option markets into the DD series and improve their performance for systemic risk analysis, while avoiding additional more restrictive assumptions in the Merton model, especially with respect to the joint distribution features and dynamics of individual risk. and the IMF published both Average and Portfolio DD series in country reports for the euro area and the United States (Annett et al., 2005; Čihák and Koeva Brooks, 2009; Mühleisen et al., 2006) .
The analysis of DD averages (sometimes also medians or other quantiles) is most common in the financial stability publications. Simple averages of individual DD are highly informative of the dynamics of system-wide risks but can be misleading if analyzed alone since they do not take into account bank heterogeneity, size differences, risk interdependences and sector-wide tail risks.
While weighted averages or quantile DD partially solve the bank size problem, they are more useful when distress correlations are low and thus do not tackle well the interdependences among banks and fail to react to swings in periods of financial stress (Čihák, 2007; Chan-Lau and Gravelle, 2005) .
On the other hand, Portfolio Distance-to-Default based on historical return information tracks the evolution of the lower bound to the joint probabilities of distress (De Nicolò and Tieman, 2007) and enhances therefore information quality of Average Distance-to-Default series, since it takes into account bank size and tackle risk interdependence among banks 7 .
When the PDD series are computed using realized pairwise covariances, as described in Appendix B and in De Nicolò and Tieman (2007) , the joint dynamics works primarily as follows:
when the banks' returns comovement increases in times of market distress, showing higher interdependences, both series tend to drop and the gap between them tends to narrow. Since Portfolio DD is in general higher than Average DD and therefore is a lower bound of distress, the joint movement of DD series contains relevant information about increasing comovement and hence systemic risk. 
The Sample
The samples used to compute the Portfolio Distance-to-Default (PDD) and Average Distance- [Insert Tables 1 to 3 here]
The bank sample used to compute the ADD series is a subset of the former. These banks are considered the core of the European banking system in terms of systemic risk and for the purposes of this research. This subsample consists of 34 large systemically important financial institutions, i.e. the largest 33 banks in the PDD sample plus the ING Group 10 . Ideally, the PDD and ADD samples should match perfectly, but the availability of liquid option prices acts as a practical 9 Additionally, options on the EURO STOXX Banks Index are also available for the analysis of the banking system in the Eurozone.
10 According to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) methodology, ING Group belongs to the STOXX 600 Insurance Index due to its bancassurance business model. This institution is however considered a bank in most bank rankings, most empirical research on financial stability and even EU-wide stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA).
constraint. Accordingly, an initial sample of 52 banks, for which option implied volatilities were available, was filtered according to the individual option data length and quality. As additional criterion, the banks in the ADD subsample had to be constituents of the index at the beginning and during at least 70% of the trading days included in the analysis. Table 4 lists the resulting 34 banks in this subsample. There are three special cases worth pointing out. Fortis, HBOS and Alliance & Leicester were large and established banks in the sample until they were taken over by other large financial institutions from the sample, BNP Paribas, Lloyds Banking Group and Santander, respectively. As these acquisitions took place late in the sample, the banks were constituents since the start and had liquid option prices, these three banks were not dropped from the ADD sample.
[Insert Table 4 In addition to the relevant market shares in domestic markets, these banks also operate at a large cross-border scale throughout Europe and in the rest of the world, which illustrates their large cross-jurisdictional activity and complexity. On average, around 30% of their total revenues was generated in a European country other than the home market and over 25% of total revenues was generated outside Europe in 2008 (Posen and Véron, 2009) 3.2 Calibration of Average Distance-to-Default Series.
The Average Distance-to-Default (ADD) is represented in (1) below and is obtained by taking the simple average across N = 34 individual bank DD series 18 .
where is the individual DD i T periods ahead 19 . As presented in (2) below, for each bank i = 1, . . . , 34, DD i,t is a function of a distress barrier D i,t , obtained from the banks' balance sheet data; the rate of growth of its assets -approximated by the risk-free interest rate in the respective 15 The fact that these banks have options on their stocks adds an additional source of comovement, compared to banks without traded options, which is relevant in terms of systemic risk analysis (Agyei-Ampomah and Mazouz, 2011) .
16 Based on data from Bankscope and European Central Bank (2010) 17 Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Barclays, HSBC, Société Générale, UBS, RBS and BNP Paribas. The rest of banks in the list are not European. This list covers several measures of interconnectedness, substitutability and complexity.
18 In the benchmark model, all calculations are conducted with data reported in the currency of the bank's home market. Data in converted into euro were also computed with very little differences on aggregate.
19 Set at one year, as standard practice in the literature.
home market, r i,t 20 -and two unobservable variables, namely the implied value of assets A i,t and the implied assets volatility σ A i,t . The latter two variables are estimated with standard iterative techniques using the market value of equity E i,t and equity price return volatility σ E i,t , obtained in this paper from individual equity options as explained in Appendix A.
Balance sheet and market data were obtained for the period between 30 September 2002 and 29 April 2011 (2240 trading days) 21 . Balance sheet data comprise annual and interim data on total assets, short-term liabilities and equity obtained from Bankscope. The market-based data include daily observations of risk-free interest rates, market capitalization, euro exchange rates and at-the-money calls and puts implied volatilities 22 . The risk-free interest rates are 10-year government bond yields in each bank's country of origin. See Table 5 for a description of data and sources.
Individual DD series have daily frequency. In practical terms, this means the balance sheet information has to be modified from its original quarterly, half-yearly or, in few cases, yearly frequencies 23 . In this paper, the original data were interpolated into daily series using cubic splines. In a second step, daily default barriers (the face value of short-term liabilities plus half of that of long-term liabilities) are computed using these new series of daily balance sheet items. The last step before computing the daily average DD series is to convert put and call implied volatilities into an average implied volatility and then calibrate the individual DD.
Calibration of Portfolio Distance-to-Default Series.
The expression for the PDD series is the following:
where P DD t is the Portfolio Distance-to-Default T periods ahead. The definition of the inputs in the PDD case are the same as in (2). However, as the PDD assumes that individual banks are regarded as a big bank, some relevant methodological changes are worth pointing out.
The calibration of (3) requires the aggregation of balance sheet data into a single series. Hence, the individual annual and interim data on total assets, short-term liabilities and equity are first converted into euro using bilateral exchange rates against the euro and then added up across the actual constituents from the portfolio, P = 91, to compute quarterly portfolio's distress barrier D P,t , before daily interpolation. The rate of growth of the portfolio assets r P,t is proxied by the Eurozone synthetic 10-year government bond yield 24 .
Finally, the estimation of the unobservable variables, namely the portfolio's implied value of assets A P,t and the portfolio's implied asset volatility σ A P,t , was conducted using the equity market value of the portfolio E P,t , directly taken as the euro-denominated market value of the reference index, and the portfolio's equity volatility obtained from the index options σ Finally, implied volatilities of put and call options on the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index are also transformed into daily averages. Using implied volatilities from the reference index and its main constituents means in practice that this paper does not only add a forward looking component to the ADD and PDD series, but also that no covariance structure is assumed in the calibration of the aggregated data, which constitutes an important difference with existing applications of PDD (Annett et al., 2005; De Nicolò and Tieman, 2007; Echeverría et al., 2006 Echeverría et al., , 2009 Gray and Malone, 2008) . Equity volatility is taken directly from options market data, introducing market perceptions of joint distress risk and its features under extreme events.
This section reports the results of the calibration of ADD and PDD series described in the previous section. It focuses on the properties of the Average Distance-to-Default (ADD) and
Portfolio Distance-to-Default (PDD) series and their difference as a tool to monitor systemic risk in Europe's banking system, namely 1) the three series allow to monitor the banking system as a whole and look at interdependences between banks over time; 2) they are capable of identifying long term trends of build-up of risk in the sector, while showing a quick and short-lived reaction to specific market events seen as results of market sentiment and fluctuations; 3) they are smooth, avoiding low signal-to-noise ratios and fuzzy signals, which allows one to track systemic risk over time and during crisis and non-crisis episodes; 4) they contain forward-looking signals of distress compared to other specifications of the indicator that contain past information and to other alternative market-based indicators based only on stock prices; and 5) the convey richer information of system-wide tail risk and other market-wide policy actions via the relationship between the reference index and the constituents.
Distance-to-Default Series Dynamics and Systemic Risk Outlook
Figure 1 plots together the forward-looking Average Distance-to-Default (ADD) and Portfolio Distance-to-Default (PDD) series, their difference and also the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index as a reference. Table 6 provides the summary statistics of these DD series, denoted as benchmark model, and those of other DD series computed with alternative specifications to be described below 25 . These three series provide a good picture of the market assessment and risk outlook of the banking system in Europe. As expected, PDD moves along and above ADD over the entire sample, with some exceptional periods where ADD exceeds PDD 26 . The PDD series also shows a higher standard deviation and positive skewness compared to the ADD series. The first feature illustrates the quick reaction of the PDD series to new information and their effect on returns comovement across the sample, while the second feature shows the role of ADD and PDD as lower and higher bounds of joint distress indicators, respectively.
Given a specific trend direction in the series, the difference between PDD and ADD narrows 25 Figure 2 shows the series starting in 2005 to account for the generalized adoption of IFRS accounting standards that might have introduced a break in the series due to revaluation of balance sheet items, see European Central Bank (2006) and Rapp and Qu (2007) for further discussion. [Insert Table 6 here]
The ADD and PDD series start at very low levels and with a very narrow gap in the aftermath and November 2010. This event means that, given high volatility in the market and high expected comovement of stock returns, the perception of risk in the financial system as a whole is more pessimistic than the aggregation of case-by-case assessments and is mainly driven by the difference between the option implied and equity volatility information on the reference index and on its constituents.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here]
Smoothness Properties
Figures 5 and 6 show the DD series using put implied volatilities and volatilities from a GARCH(1,1) model in the calibration of both ADD and PDD series, respectively. Their summary statistics are reported in Table 6 . The model assumptions for these specifications are the same as in the benchmark model with the only difference in the data source of equity volatility used for calibration. The results are robust to this variation as regards the ability of the indicator to detect build-up of stress but they serve to illustrate the smoothness of the original series with respect to other possible but slightly different model specifications. However, as put options are more reactive to market specific events and contain important information regarding the demands for portfolio insurance and market volatility (Whaley, 2009) , DD series obtained using average implied volatilities are smoother, which is a valued property of market-based indicators in the analysis of systemic risk, and provide lower standard deviations. The results of this paper focus therefore on them only, although it is desirable that the analysis of short term market distress takes into account the information potential of put-derived DD series 27 .
DD series based on GARCH(1,1) model volatilities are plotted in Figure 6 . They have larger standard deviations than the benchmark DD series and look clearly and significantly more volatile and with more swings along the sample and thus convey a low and undesired signal-to-noise ratio 28 .
GARCH-modeled volatilities have the advantage of quick adjustment to changes in the underlying 27 Put options are extensively used for insurance purposes, i.e. hedgers buy puts if they have concerns about a potential drop in the markets (Whaley, 2009) . Kelly et al. (2011) show the usefulness of put options pricing to evaluate government bailout guarantees.
28 GARCH(1,1) volatilities were estimated using prices of individual banks' shares and STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index since 31/12/1998, adding an observation as daily closing prices (denominated in local currency) become available in order to generate more realistic data series. The DD series followed the same estimation methodology described in Section 3. In terms of the Portfolio DD, this means that GARCH volatilities are estimated for the index and covariances are neglected. Although not reported, Granger causality tests were conducted for average, portfolio and differences series, showing rejection of the null hypothesis that main DD do not cause GARCH-generated DD for 5, 10 and 20 day lags, especially for the Average DD.
data, but they also tend to overshoot. This feature means more noise in the DD indicator, which leads in practice to a difficult interpretation of its signals and more frequent false positives in the series of DD differences. As a result, reliability of this approach is reduced in terms of monitoring systemic risk compared to both the benchmark series and even DD series constructed with historical volatilities. In addition, the trends in the GARCH-derived DD series are not as clear as those depicted in Figures 1 and 2 and there is more dominance of the short-lived market events.
[Insert Figures 5 and 6 here] In order to test econometrically this forward-looking feature of Average and Portfolio DD series derived from option implied volatilities and their difference, I run pairwise Granger causality tests vis-à-vis these backward-looking monthly DD series 29 . Results are reported in Table 7 .
Forward-looking Properties
[Insert Table 7 here]
Results of Granger tests provide econometric support to the forward-looking feature of our series. Table 7 shows that forward-looking DD indicators and also their difference Granger cause ECB's DD series up to two years, as the graphs suggested. More robust results are obtained for longer lags in the test using ADD because of the similar method used to obtain these series and because of the effect of transitory volatility shocks in the PDD indicator is partially cancelled out in averages and median DD series. The results are also more robust in the case of the series computed for the Eurozone banks, since the sample is more likely to concide 30 . These results strongly suggest that there is still a backward-looking component embedded that is not present in the DD series that incorporate option price information. The DD series constructed in this paper have therefore an important advantage as a tool of early detection of systemic risk.
The forward-looking DD series were compared also to other two market- 
31
In the original application, the condition includes two weeks of negative abnormal instead of one. However, in the European case, the speed of transmission of stress is somehow lower than in the US due to the country-specific circumstances at play. The reference index to compute market stock returns is the STOXX Europe 600 Index. See International Monetary Fund (2011) for a more detailed explanation of the indicator's construction, properties and its application to the US banking system using data from 17 financial institutions.
32 Namely time-varying and rolling CoVaR series (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) , Joint Probability of Distress (Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009 ) , LIBOR-OIS spread, Diebold-Yilmaz Connectedness Index (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009), Credit Suisse Fear Barometer, VIX Index, Systemic Liquidity Risk Indicator (Severo, 2011) , the yield-curve and backward-looking DD series.
33 Dexia, KBC, Credit Suisse, UBS, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Crédit Agricole, BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Intesa Sanpaolo, Unicredit, ING, BBVA and Santander comovement and contagion, but it does not provide signals of increasing risk from higher leverage in banks' balance sheets. Figure 11 clearly shows that spikes of this indicator (plotted on inverted scale to facilitate comparison) correspond to those short-lived episodes where the gap between PDD and ADD narrows significantly.
The lower two panels in Table 7 show the results of the Granger Causality tests applied to these two additional systemic risk measures. They show that the forward-looking series developed in this paper provide a better performance in terms of early systemic stress detection. In particular, the PDD series Granger causes the SF S in the short run while the ADD series precede its signals up to 24 months. This result is largely driven by the similar type of systemic risk elements captured by the ADD series and the SF S indicator. The results of the tests applied to the DY CI provide an additional insight. While the ADD series do not seem to Granger cause this indicator, the PDD and the PDD-ADD difference Granger cause the DY CI up to three months, which illustrate the information content of PDD series about comovement, contagion and joint distress, which is relatively less perceptible in ADD series compared to its ability to assess the intensity of financial distress. The forward-looking DD series do not Granger cause the DY CI for longer lags probably due to the modelling ability of this indicator to incorporate quickly new information about joint stress, including tail events.
The PDD-ADD Difference
Thus far, the section has stressed the ability of the forward-looking Distance-to-Default series and their difference to assess the risk outlook in the banking system in Europe over time and to provide early systemic stress detection vis-à-vis alternative specifications of Distance-to-Default and other market-based indicators. This subsection gives a closer look at the difference between the PDD and ADD series and its properties besides the prevalence of expected comovement changes across bank returns implied by the differences between the index implied volatility and the implied volatilities of its constituents.
As described in Section 2.3, the difference between PDD and ADD series embeds to a large extent the comovement and correlation structure of banks' returns. In the case of series where calibration relies on realized pairwise covariances, it is a full reflection. In the case of the series computed with individual and index option implied volatilities, the role of expected correlation on the DD gap remains important but it also includes additional elements of sector-wide tail risks 20 in extreme times. In addition, the PDD-ADD gap depends on the volatility regime in the equity markets. During crisis times, there is stronger effect of the comovement component while under low volatility regimes, the other DD inputs, i.e. relative difference in terms of leverage and return growth, play a more relevant role.
In order to illustrate these points, Figure 12 shows the empirical exceedance correlations 34 between standardized PDD and ADD series following the methodology described in Ang and Chen (2002) and Longin and Solnik (2001) In order to add further insights, Figure 15 shows a scatter plot where the PDD and ADD difference is displayed against the Average Implied Correlation. The Average Implied Correlation (AIC) is a weighted difference of the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index implied volatility and the weighted average of the implied volatilities of the banks in sample. This is a measure of the markets expectation of the future correlation of the index components and was generated following the CBOE S&P 500 Implied Correlation Index methodology 35 and also analyzed in Skintzi and Refenes (2005) .
[Insert Figure 15 here] Figure 15 shows a negative and nonlinear relationship between the DD differences and the AIC series, with a large Spearman correlation coefficient rho of -0.88 and a Kendall's tau of -0.69 36 , which illustrates the correlation component of the gap between Portfolio DD and Average DD.
Yet, as in the previous case, the relationship is stronger when the gap between PDD and ADD is low but it allows large AIC fluctuations under very narrow DD gap. The relationship flattens out as these DD series diverge more, where idiosyncratic bank risk components dominate and the other risk DD inputs play a stronger role in the DD calibration.
The red data points in the graph show the period after August 2007. As in the case of simple differences between the implied volatilities, the relationship between DD differences and AIC becomes very steep but it includes also narrow gaps of the DD series and, more strikingly low comovement regimes. This evidence is in line with recent findings in the literature and illustrate that options prices endow the DD series with richer information than alternative specifications that are highly relevant for systemic risk and are not only related to correlation or comovement, but also with tail events. As final robustness check, I also computed the AIC series based on implied assets volatilities obtained from the DD calibration. These series are plotted in Figure 16 and show that the asset-based average implied correlation has a much weaker relationship with the PDD-ADD difference, with a Spearman correlation coefficient rho of -0.10 and a Kendall's tau of -0.09, which
illustrates that the PDD-ADD spread is not only a result of returns expected correlations nor implied asset correlations.
[Insert Figure 16 here] In other words, they incorporate very quickly market expectations via option prices that do not distort the overall risk outlook in the financial system. Notes: → denotes acquisition by the nearest numbered bank listed above. * Also in the sample of the Average Distance-to-Default series. (2) Also constituent between Q1-08 and Q1-11. Notes: → denotes acquisition by the nearest numbered bank listed above. (3) Also constituent between Q3-09 and Q1-11. Marfin Financial Group (GRS314003005, GR), Glitnir Banki (IS0000000131, IS), KBC Ancora (BE0003867844, BE) and First Active (IE0004321422, IE) were excluded from the sample due to data quality reasons. In all these cases, their corresponding index weights did not exceed 0.2%.) Source. Author's calculations based on Ang and Chen (2002) and Longin and Solnik (2001) . The bivariate normal distribution assumes a the same correlation coefficient between the standardized DD series (ρ = 0.9445). 
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A Derivation of Individual Distance-to-Default Series
Given the three principles in CCA mentioned in Section 2.1, company value (represented by its assets, A) is the sum of its risky debt (D) and equity (E). Since equity is a junior claim to debt, the former can be modeled and calculated as a standard call option on the assets with exercise price equal to the value of risky debt (also known in the literature as distress barrier or default barrier). E = max{0, A − D} (A.1)
Given the assumption of assets distributed as a Generalized Brownian Motion, the application of the standard Black-Sholes option pricing formula yields the closed-form expression of equity E as a European call option on the bank's assets A at maturity T:
where r is the instantaneous rate of growth of assets, generally approximated by the risk-free rate, and N (•) is the cumulative normal distribution. The values of d 1 and d 2 are expressed as:
where σ A is the is asset volatility. The Merton model uses an additional equation that links the former to the volatility of the bank's equity σ E by applying Itô's Lemma:
The Merton model uses equations (A.2) and (A.5) to obtain the implied asset value A and volatility σ A , which are not observable and must be estimated by numerical methods. The equity volatility σ E enters as initial value of market value of σ A in the iteration. The growth rate of the assets is proxied by risk-free interest rate r as in Gropp et al. (2006) and most papers in the literature. Once a numerical solutions for A and σ A are found, the Distance-to-Default T periods ahead is calculated as:
The implementation of (A.6) uses in general market value as the value of equity E; historical volatilities as equity price return volatility σ E ; government bond yields as the risk-free interest rate r and the face value of short-term liabilities plus half of that of long-term liabilities as the default barrier D. The time horizon T is usually set at one year.
In this paper, the equity volatility is obtained from individual bank equity option implied volatilities. Alternatively, Duan (1994 Duan ( , 2000 and Duan et al. (2004) propose a computation method where A and σ A are obtained based on a maximum likelyhood (ML) estimation and a one-to-one relationship between asset value A and equity value E, yielding accurate estimates even in relatively small samples (Lando, 2004) . Even though estimates tend not to differ much, this approach provides also distributions of the estimates for testing hypotheses, which is an advantage compared to the method used in this paper. However, the application of the maximum likelyhood estimation would unable this work to profit from the information potential from option prices. In addition, Duan et al. (2004) and Gropp et al. (2006) argue that one of the reasons why the ML is more attractive is the fact that historical volatilities tend to understimate DD in periods of increasing stock prices and to do the opposite during downturns. This issue is not present in the case of option implied volatilities, as they are market-determined expectations of future volatility.
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B Derivation of Portfolio Distance-to-Default Series
The Portfolio Distance-to-Default treats the portfolio of P banks in the sample as a single entity, thus the Merton model assumptions still apply and the calculation method is the same as explained in Appendix A. Under these assumptions, the calibration of the PDD requires some additional practical considerations, especially about the difference between the approach in this paper and other applications in the literature, such as Annett et al. (2005) ;
De Nicolò and Tieman (2007); Echeverría et al. (2006 Echeverría et al. ( , 2009 and Gray and Malone (2008) .
In particular, the closed-form expression of PDD T periods ahead is represented by the following expression:
D P is the total value of the portfolio's risky debt or distress barrier and is obtained by adding up the individual distress barriers across the P banks in the sample, i.e. D P = P i=1 D i . r P is the instantaneous rate of growth of the portfolio's assets and in general is proxied by a weighted average of individual r i from government bond yields of each bank's home market, i.e. r P = P i=1 w i r i . The individual weights w i are obtained from estimates of implied assets A i , thus w i = A i A P . In this paper, r P is proxied by the Eurozone synthetic 10-year government bond yield.
The remaining terms in (B.1), namely the portfolio asset volatility σ P and the value of the portfolio assets A P , should be in principle obtained as in the case of individual banks, solving the system of equations (A.2) and (A.5).
The traditional approach aggregates individual estimates of implied assets A i , thus A P = P i=1 A i and it aggregates the individual estimates of asset volatilities using a asset return based covariance structure, σ 2 P = P i=1 p j=1 w i w j σ ij , where σ ij is the asset return covariance of banks i and j. In this paper, the calibration of PDD does solve equations (A.2) and (A.5) to obtain σ P and A P , hence the equity market value of the portfolio, E P = P i=1 E i , is obtained directly from the reference index on a daily basis, and the equity volatility σ E is obtained from index option implied volatilities. As a result, the difference between the PDD and the ADD is not based on the covariance term in σ P , but on additional signals from the option markets.
